I used ContraBot to test the claim that property dualism is true. ContraBot challenged my belief and forced me to think critically. Access ContraBot here or read more about it here.

Prompt: I believe that property dualism is the correct theory of mind. the zombie argument proves this and science will never be able to explain consciousness

ContraBot: Alright, let’s tear into this.
Property Dualism as the Correct Theory of Mind
So, property dualism claims that while the mind emerges from physical processes (like brain activity), it possesses non-physical properties (like consciousness) that aren’t reducible to physical terms. Seems plausible on the surface, but let’s probe deeper: what are these “non-physical properties”? How do you know they exist in a coherent, distinct category beyond just being “mysterious” phenomena we haven’t yet fully explained?

If something emerges from a physical system, shouldn’t it be entirely describable by that system’s laws, even if complex? It feels like you’re assuming these non-physical properties are real without showing they couldn’t, in principle, be fully understood through a physicalist approach.

The Zombie Argument Proves It
Ah, the famous philosophical zombie: a creature that’s physically identical to a human but lacks consciousness. It’s used to argue that consciousness isn’t reducible to brain processes because a zombie can exist in theory with all the same brain states but no conscious experience.

But what exactly does this argument prove beyond just illustrating an intuition? Philosophical zombies are conceivable (we can imagine them), but that doesn’t mean they’re possible in any meaningful, real-world sense. For instance, I can conceive of a square circle, but it doesn’t follow that one could exist. Conceivability doesn’t equal possibility.

Moreover, can you explain how the zombie argument addresses the possibility that consciousness is an emergent property fully rooted in brain function? Just because you can imagine brain function without consciousness doesn’t mean it’s metaphysically possible. Couldn’t the zombie argument just be a mental trick—a failure of our current conceptual framework, not proof of dualism?

Science Will Never Explain Consciousness
Strong claim. Are you so certain that science will never explain consciousness? Let’s think about this. In the 1800s, people might have said science will never explain life itself—hence “vitalism,” the idea that life involves a non-material force (vital spark) beyond biology. Then DNA was discovered, and it turned out life is reducible to physical processes after all.

Consciousness seems mysterious now, but that doesn’t mean it’s outside the realm of physical explanation. What specific feature of consciousness do you think will forever elude scientific understanding? Does science need to explain subjective experience itself or simply correlate it with physical processes? Can you be sure that an answer we haven’t discovered yet is inherently impossible?

Also, could this assertion about the limits of science just be an expression of current ignorance rather than a permanent barrier?

Let’s get to the core:
Can you clarify why property dualism is logically superior to physicalism? How can you prove non-physical properties exist, as opposed to just being phenomena we don’t yet fully understand?

Does the zombie argument really “prove” anything other than our intuitions are limited? Why should we trust these intuitions over a physicalist explanation?

What is it about consciousness that you think is forever beyond scientific explanation? Have you considered that future developments could solve what currently seems like an intractable mystery?

Your belief is fascinating, but you might need to provide more justification to back up these strong assertions. Let’s see how you handle these challenges.

Prompt: Regarding your 3rd point – consciousness by its very nature could never be explained by science. This is because it is subjective. Science, on the other hand, is objective. QED

ContraBot You’re pulling the old “science is objective, consciousness is subjective” trick, which sounds compelling—until you dig into it. Let’s break it down.

Subjectivity vs. Objectivity: Too Clean of a Split?
You’re asserting that because consciousness is subjective, it’s categorically inaccessible to objective science. But why assume such a rigid boundary? If subjective experiences (qualia) arise from brain processes, wouldn’t it be possible to objectively study the physical structures that give rise to subjective experiences?

Sure, science deals in the measurable and observable, but the line between “subjective” and “objective” isn’t as clean as you might think. Neurologists are already correlating brain states with subjective reports of experience. Think about brain scans that light up when people describe feeling pain or happiness. You can’t directly measure the “pain” or “happiness,” but you can measure the brain processes that correspond to it. Couldn’t science do a functional mapping of subjective experiences, even if it never fully captures what it “feels” like?

Subjectivity as a Limitation or a Feature?
You claim that consciousness is subjective by its very nature—but isn’t that just a restatement of the problem rather than an explanation? Saying, “consciousness can’t be explained because it’s subjective” is like saying, “we can’t study stars because they’re far away.” Is it possible that your belief relies more on terminology than on substance?

If science developed ways to simulate or predict subjective experience based on brain patterns, would that be a violation of the “subjective” nature of consciousness, or would it just demonstrate that subjectivity is explainable in objective terms?

QED? You’ve Got to Prove it First
You threw a QED in there—quod erat demonstrandum—but there’s a massive gap between asserting that science is objective and concluding that consciousness can never be explained by it. This doesn’t follow as demonstration, only as an assumption.

For example, just because science hasn’t explained something fully yet doesn’t mean it can’t. Would you have claimed that science could never explain life or intelligence a century ago? Or that we’ll never fully explain the complexities of genetics or artificial intelligence?

What’s your actual proof for why subjective experience is metaphysically beyond the scope of objective study? Isn’t it possible that the subjective experience is just a more complex emergent property of the physical brain?

How Do You Define “Explain”?
Science may not “explain” consciousness in a way that gives us direct subjective access to another’s inner world (like reading minds), but it could still offer explanations that predict and correlate subjective experiences to brain activity. Wouldn’t that be an explanation in itself, even if it’s not total?

What kind of explanation are you demanding? Do you want science to make subjective experience feel objective, or are you simply defining explanation so narrowly that only subjectivity can “explain” subjectivity? That’s circular.

The Real Question:
Is it possible that the reason you think science can’t explain consciousness is that you’re assuming an unnecessarily strict boundary between subjective and objective phenomena? Could it be that science is inching toward understanding subjective experience—just not in the way you might expect? Can you prove that science will forever be limited by this distinction, or are you overestimating the power of the “subjective” card?

If you’re invoking “QED,” the burden is on you to actually demonstrate that science will hit a wall here—not just speculate based on current ignorance.